Legal Capacity and Decision-Making

The ability to make legally recognised decisions is fundamental to the exercise of human rights and is reflected in the core values of dignity, autonomy, participation and liberty. Respect for human rights requires that capacity be presumed absent evidence establishing incapacity. The process of capacity assessment also raises human rights issues as a determination of incapacity can have significant ramifications for the enjoyment of a person’s human rights. This is particularly the case where the assessment is triggered by ageist assumptions or fails to respect the person’s dignity or autonomy, or where it does not maximise their participation in the process as much as possible. This chapter argues that capacity and its assessment are fundamental to respecting individual human rights. It will explore the question of capacity and its assessment within the human rights framework established in Chap. 3. It will discuss the nature of capacity generally including the impact of age, particularly in the ‘old, old’ grouping. The question of legal capacity will then be explored including its assessment. Examples have been drawn from select areas relevant to persons as they age—wills, enduring documents and driving. Final comments will then be made demonstrating the inherent role that a human rights framework has in capacity and its assessment, and what this should look like.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic €32.70 /Month

Buy Now

Price includes VAT (France)

eBook EUR 117.69 Price includes VAT (France)

Softcover Book EUR 147.69 Price includes VAT (France)

Hardcover Book EUR 158.24 Price includes VAT (France)

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Notes

Re Caldwell [1999] QSC 182, 12 (Mackenzie J); Law Reform Committee, Parliament of Victoria (2010), 109–10.

See, for example: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) arts 7, 9 12 (‘ICCPR’); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), arts 11, 15.

World Health Organization (2015), 7. Purser and Rosenfeld (2014).

American Bar Association Commission on Law and Aging/American Psychological Association Assessment of Capacity in Older Adults Project Working Group (2008) 15–6.

World Health Organization (2015), 8. See Box 1.2 on page 9 for a discussion of the result of health and pension inequities in relation to capacity. For example, a study in England demonstrated that life expectancy and the time lived free of disability varied, being conditional upon where someone resided. The life expectancy of those in wealthier neighbourhoods in England was 6 years more than those living in poorer neighbourhoods with the difference in the number of those who lived disability-free being 13 years.

See, for example: Australian Law Reform Commission (2017), 286; Purser (2017); Law Society of New South Wales (2016); Queensland Law Society, Allens Linklaters and Queensland Advocacy Incorporated (2014).

See, for example, Purser (2015); Purser and Rosenfeld (2014, 2016).

American Bar Association Commission on Law and Aging/American Psychological Association Assessment of Capacity in Older Adults Project Working Group (2008); American Bar Association Commission on Law and Aging, American Psychological Association and National College of Probate Judges (2006).

British Medical Association and the Law Society (2015).

World Health Organization (2015), 28–9, 32. See pages 31–2 and 100–3 for the trajectories of healthy ageing involving functional ability and intrinsic capacity. The trajectories can be divided into three main categories—that of high capacity, declining capacity and lost capacity, noting that the decline of capacity is not necessarily a steady downwards trend and that capacity differs for every person (that is, recognising its task and time specific nature). Figure 2.4 (page 33) sets out a public-health framework for healthy ageing identifying opportunities for action throughout the life course.

Carney and Keyzer (2007).

Sullivan (2004), 131. See also Kitamura and Takahashi (2007), 578; Berg et al. (1996), 348–9; Kerridge et al. (2009), 244.

O’Neill and Peisah (2011), 955; Wilen Berg et al. (1996), 351; Karlawish et al. (2005), 1514. See also Cairns et al. (2005), 373; MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and the Law (2004); Gurrera et al. (2006), 1367; Kitamura and Takahashi (2007), 579; Sturman (2005), 955; Lai and Karlawish (2007), 105; Purser et al. (2009), 796.

Setterlund et al. (2002), 128; Attorney General’s Department of New South Wales (2008), 27. Cockerill et al. (2005), 8. Falk and Hoffman (2014). Dārziņš et al. (2000), 8–9. Arias (2013), 144. Dunn et al. (2006), 1323–4; Carney and Keyzer (2007), 255.

Frost et al. (2015), 8; Dārziņš et al. (2000), 4; Sargent & Anor v Brangwin [2013] QSC 306; World Health Organization (2015), 26, 58–9.

O’Neill and Peisah (2011), 3. World Health Organization (2015), 58. Okonkwo et al. (2008), 656. For more on this see, for example: World Health Organization (2015), 59. Lin and Lewis (2015), 237. UK Government (2015). Australian Bureau of Statistics (2009), 2–3; Access Economics (2009), i; and AgeUK (2016), 12–3. Population Reference Bureau (2015); Alzheimer’s Association (2016). Australian Bureau of Statistics (2009), 2–3; Access Economics (2009), i. AgeUK (2016), 12–3. Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2016). Peisah and Brodaty (1994), 382; Liptzin et al. (2010), 950. O’Neill and Peisah (2011), 3. Peisah and Brodaty (1994), 382. Alzheimer’s Australia (2009), 5. Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549; Purser (2015). Purser and Sullivan (2019). See, for example: O’Connor (2010); Hall (2012); Purser and Sullivan (2019). See, for example: O’Connor (2010); Hall (2012). Falk and Hoffman (2014), 856. Creyke (1995), 10–2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), art 2.

Moye and Marson (2007), 3; Harada et al. (2013), 737–8; Moye et al. (2013), 162; World Health Organization (2015), 25.

Moye et al. (2013), 162. Harada et al. (2013), 738. Moye et al. (2013), 167. World Health Organization (2015), 74.

Gibbons v Wright (1954) 91 CLR 423, 438 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ). Applied in, for example, Re Beaney deceased [1978] 2 All ER 595 and In the estate of Park deceased [1954] P 89.

Hoff v Atherton [2005] WTLR 99, [33] citing Re K (Enduring Power of Attorney) [1988] Ch 310, 313. Frost et al. (2015), 6; Masterman-Lister v Brutton [2003] WTLR 259 CA. Grisso (2003), 23.

Attorney General’s Department of New South Wales (2008), 27; Setterlund et al. (2002), 28; Dārziņš et al. (2000), 4–6; Sullivan (2004), 132.

Gibbons v Wright (1954) 91 CLR 423. O’Neill and Peisah (2011). Sprehe and Kerr (1996), 255; Moye et al. (2013), 163. On each of these terms see: Purser (2017). Sprehe and Kerr (1996), 255; Moye et al. (2013), 163.

Bull v Fulton (1942) 66 CLR 295, 337 (Williams J). See also Frost et al. (2015), 250–2 for a discussion on delirium.

Tippet v Moore (1911) 13 CLR 248, 250 (Griffith CJ).

Marson et al. (2004), 78. On the link between lucid intervals and fluctuating cognition see, for example: Shulman et al. (2015), 287.

Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113; Union Bank v Whitelaw [1906] VLR 711; Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1974] 3 All ER 757; Wingrove v Wingrove (1885) 11 PD 81; and Hall v Hall (1868) LR 1 P & D 481; and Nicholson v Knaggs [2009] VSC 64.

Marson and Hebert (2007); Marson and Sabatino (2012), 6. ABA/APA (2008); World Health Organization (2015), 55. Marson et al. (2000). Marson (2013), 382. Marson and Hebert (2007). See also Pinsker et al. (2010), 333; Webber et al. (2002), 250. Marson and Hebert (2007). See also Pinsker et al. (2010), 333; Webber et al. (2002), 250. Marson and Sabatino (2012), 6–7. Jourdan and Glickman (1991), 415.

On the role of ADLs and IADLs in intrinsic capacity across the life course as viewed by the World Health Organization see: World Health Organization (2015), 65.

Marson (2013), 383; Falk and Hoffman (2014), 860. Marson (2013), 383. Marson and Hebert (2007). Marson (2013), 383; Lock (2016), 18. Earnst et al. (2001), 110–11; Pinsker et al. (2010), 333; Marson (2013), 384. Marson (2013), 384. Pinsker et al. (2010), 333, 336, 338. See also Collier et al. (2005). Lonie and Purser (2017), 44.

Moye and Marson (2007), 7; Marson et al. (2000); and Cockerill et al. (2005), 49; Marson et al. (2000); Moye and Marson (2007), 7–8.

Cockerill et al. (2005), 49. Kershaw and Webber (2004), 338. Pinsker et al. (2010), 336.

See generally Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549, 565–6 (Cockburn CJ) for common law countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The position in the United Kingdom is also informed by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK). On this, see the British Medical Association and the Law Society (2015), 85–6; Myers (2014), 44; and Frost et al. (2015), 55–63. For the position in the United States of America see, for example, Newman v Smith 77 Fla. 633, 673–74, 82 So. 236, 247–48 (1918); Kapp (2015), 165; and Shulman et al. (2009), 436.

Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549, 565–6 (Cockburn CJ).

Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549, 565–6 (Cockburn CJ). Banks has been applied in, for example, Read v Carmody [1998] NSWCA 182 (23 July 1998); Boughton v Knight (1873) LR 3 P & D 64, 65 (Sir James Hannen); Posener and Jacoby (2008), 754; and Frost et al. (2015), 40–8.

Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277 applied in Challen v Pitt [2004] QSC 365. Purser and Lonie (2019). Jacoby and Steer (2007), 155; Shulman et al. (2009), 434; Marson et al. (2004), 82. Parker v Felgate (1883) 8 PD 171; Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558, 567, 572. Jacoby and Steer (2007), 156.

Bull v Fulton (1942) 66 CLR 295, 299 (Latham CJ); 341 (Williams J); Shaw v Crichton [1995] NSWCA BC 9,505,228 (23 August 1995) 2–4 (Handley, Cole & Powell JJ).

Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558.

For more on this see, for example: Purser K (2015. For a modern interpretation of the testamentary capacity test see, for example: Re Loxston, Abbott v Richardson [2006] WTLR 156, and Read v Carmody [1998] NSWCA 182 (23 July 1998).

See, for example: Peisah (2005). On this see: Croucher (2009). Re Matsis [2012] QSC 349; GAU v GAV [2014] QCA 308. Standing Committee on Social Issues, Parliament of New South Wales (2010), 8.

Setterlund et al. (2002), 128. Australian Law Reform Commission (2017); Purser et al. (2018); World Health Organization (2015).

Then et al. (2018); Carney et al. (2019). Notably articles 5 and 12. Perlin (2013), 1179. Australian Law Reform Commission (2013), 30, 36; Blanck and Martinis (2015), 26. Australian Law Reform Commission (2013), 28. Gooding (2013), 437. Perlin (2013), 1176–7; Australian Law Reform Commission (2014), 38. Blanck and Martinis (2015), 26. Browning et al. (2014). Blanck and Martinis (2015), 27. Wong et al. (2016), 133. Horswill et al. (2013), 130; Wong et al. (2018), 495; Wong et al. (2016), 133. Wong et al. (2016), 133. See, for example, Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission (2012). See, for example: ICCPR, art 12 for permitted restrictions on freedom of movement. Queensland Law Reform Commission (2008), 106; Queensland Law Reform Commission (2010), 243. Australian Law Reform Commission (2013), 37. Sullivan (2004), 137. See also Berg et al. (1996), 349–51. Sullivan (2004), 135. Papageorgiou et al. (2018).

Sullivan (2004), 135; Cairns et al. (2005), 377; Kitamura and Takahashi (2007), 579; Ganzini et al. (2003), 237.

Dārziņš et al. (2000), 7.

Wadley et al. (2003), 1621. See also Pinsker et al. (2010), 333. See also Suto et al. (2005), 202; Kershaw and Webber (2008), 40.

Marson et al. (2006), 81. For more on the different approaches to assessing capacity see, for example: Purser (2017). Purser and Rosenfeld (2014). Purser and Sullivan (2019). Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006). Dārziņš et al. (2000), 139. Moye et al. (2013), 167. Queensland Law Reform Commission (2010), 61. On this, see: Purser (2017). See also British Medical Association and the Law Society (2015), 11. Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) c 9 s 1.

Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) schedule 1, part 1; Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) schedule 1, part 1 principle 7(1)-(2).

Schopp (1996), 727–8. Purser and Sullivan (2019). Schopp (1996), 472. Purser and Sullivan (2019).

References

International Instruments

Cases

Legislation

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Australian Centre for Health Law Research, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Bridget Lewis & Kelly Purser
  2. Faculty of Law, University of the Sunshine Coast, Sunshine Coast, QLD, Australia Kirsty Mackie